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The Arab world today is shaped by many ideologies that constitute the dynamic 
movements and change in it. They vary from violent to non-violent, religious to secular, 
Islamic to nationalist and fundamentalist to modernist. All of them, despite their 
diversity are characterised by some relation to tradition and modernity. The aim of the 
work is to analyse the emergence of the most significant schools of thought of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century that had seriousimpact on the later ideological 
evolution,the formation of states and national identities in the region.The work covers 
mainly the issues of the attitude of the Islamic world towards modernity, Islamic 
modernism and fundamentalism, Ottomanism, Arabism and Arab nationalism. The 
interpretations are situated in the context of the cultural shock of the clash with western 
civilization, the decline of the Ottoman Empireand struggle against colonialism.The 
work examines these ideologies, and the major thinkers that represent them such as 
Rifa‟aBadawi Rafi‟ al-Tahtawi, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad „Abduh, Rashid 
Rida,Butrus al-Bustani,ShibliShumayyil, Farah Antun, and Abd al-Rahman Al-
Kawakibi.The research is based mainly on the secondary Western and Arabic literature 
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Arabskýsvět je dnestvořenmnohýmiideologiemi, kterépředstavujídynamickáhnutí a 
neustáléproměny.Vyskytují se v mnohavariantách: odnásilnýchponenásilné, od 
náboženskýchposekulární, od islámskýchponacionalistické a od 
fundamentalistickýchpomodernistické. Všechny z nich, navzdoryjejichrozmanitosti se 
vyznačujíurčitýmvztahem k tradici a modernitě.Cílempráce je analyzovatvznik 
myšlenkových proududevatenáctého a počátkudvacátéhostoletí, 
kterémělovážnýdopadnapozdějšíideologickývývoj, formovánístátů a národníchidentit v 
regionu. Prácezahrnujepředevšímproblematikupostojeislámskéhosvětasměrem k 
modernitě, problematikuislámskéhomodernismu, fundamentalismu, osmanismu, 
arabismuaarabskéhonacionalismu. Výkladyjsousituovány do kontextukulturníhošoku v 
rámcistřetu se západnícivilizací, úpadkuOsmanskéříše a bojeprotikolonialismu. 
Prácezkoumátytoideologie, kterézastupujíjejichústřednímyslitelé: napříkladRifa'aBadawi 
Rafi' at-Tahtávi, Džamal ad-Din al-Afghání, Muhammad 'Abduh, RašídRidá, Butrus al-
Bustání, ŠibliŠumajjil, Farah Antun, aAbdar-Rahmán Al-Kawákibí. Výzkum je 
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I chose the theme of the Formation of Arabic National Thought in Levanta and 
covered it in the span of approximately the years 1800-1916 to study the beginnings and 
emergence of ideologies which had the aim of defining the political and social bases of 
the Islamic and Arabic world. 
This work can be used as a starting point and a source of inspiration for the study 
of the subsequent historical periods especially the creation of nation states after the First 
World War under the colonial rule and agreement of Sykes-Picot. The reality of these 
new states, that except of slight changes remain the same till today, with the combination 
of understanding the ideologies that were emerging prior to the First World War is 
essential for the understanding of current political and social changes in the Middle East 
and the search for identity.  
The Focus of my work is a period in history when the Arabs among other 
nationalities of the Middle East were pulled into a new world and had to think far 
beyond their own communities, societies and even beyond the boundaries of the whole 
Islamic umma. This world which the Muslims became drawn to, expressed itself in 
European influence in the trade and diplomacy, scientific discoveries that often 
challenged religious doctrines, new ways of life and relations between men and women 
and new forms of and institutions in the military and government. These are only some 
of the aspects of the clash between the east and west which started to take place mainly 
from the beginnings of the 19
th
 century. I focused on these aspects and the reactions to 
them presented in various schools of thought because they were by implication changing 
the political and social nature of the Islamic world which is the concern of my work. 





century) can be divided in two major groups. The fundamental Islamic ideologies from 
which modern political Islam has emerged and modernizing Islamic ideologies from 
which by gradual secularizing tendencies emerged the Arabic Nationalism. The 
fundamental Islamic ideologies emerged later than the modernizing and reforming 
ideologies and were in a sense a reaction to them but did not replace them. Both of these 
movements were an adaption or a reaction to various western ideologies. Whatever the 
source of their primary influence was, they were all basically a result of the realisation of 
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the European hegemony and the cultural shock felt in the house of Islam when it came 
face to face with European progress. 
Among the first authors to undertake a study on this topic is George Antonius 
and his The Arab Awakening published in 1938 which for decades paved the way in the 
field of study the modern Arab intellectual history and was claimed as a theory of Arab 
Nationalism of the twentieth century. However this book was heavily questioned 
generations later and today is regarded as being uncritical. It overemphasizes the role of 
Christian Syrians on the formation of Arab Nationalism and generally overemphasizes 
the role and influence of Arab Nationalism and Arab Nationalists dating them too deep 
in the nineteenth century.
1
 
In the upcoming years works of several western scholars started to fill the area of 
these studies among them Gibb‟s Modern Trends in Islam(1947) and Wilfred Smith‟s 
Islam in Modern History(1957). However these studies did not constitute a complete 
synthesis of the material and were more an independent scattered works.  
The first important and maybe one of the most important works in this field was 
published in 1962 by Albert Hourani under the name Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 
1798-1939. It is a book that truly filled the gap in the Middle Eastern studies when it was 
published and its importance and relevance has not decreased in time.
2
 It was the first 
book to provide a full synthesis and systematic treatment of modern Arab intellectual 
history. This work form the backbone and the chronology of my study classifying the 
evolutionary periods of the development of the schools of thought in the Arabic world. 
Among the other major works which I relied on in my study isAnthony Black‟s 
The History of Islamic Political Thought(2001), which is a major comprehensive study 
of the subject of the Islamic thought development from the time of the Prophet to the 
present therefore very essential and giving a general outlook on the period of modern 
history in the context of the whole development of Islamic thought from its emergence.
3
 
I mainly worked with the last chapter V “Islam and the West” that covered the historical 
span of my work. 
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Another helpful work was the Czech translation of Reinhard Schulze‟sGeshite 
der Islamischen Welt im 20. Jahrhundert. It is primarly a historical study and not rare of 
its kind, but what makes it special is the approach of the writer who is a historian as well 
as a linguist and filolog and therefore his method is not of a objective trace of historical 
events, agreements and wars, but rather is filled with interpretations and comparations 
based on his methodological starting points.
4
 
Among the books with less overlap with my field of study is a work of Adeed 
Dawisha Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From triumph to Despair(2003). 
As the name indicates it‟s focus is the peak of Arab Nationalism, therefore it is only 
slightly overlapping with my material of study. However precisly because this book is 
set to investigate periods subsequent to the period that I studied I found chapter two 
„Early Stirrings: The Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries” very useful. It presents 
the ideologies of this era with an emphasis on the thinkers and ideologies that were 
crucial for the formation of the movement in the next generations.
5
 
Abdellilah Belkeziz‟s The State in Contemporary Islamic Thought(2009) is a 
major and high caliber work in its field in the modern era, but only slightly overlapping 
with the content of my work, because as its name implies it studies only the Islamic 
thinkers and ideologies and only their views on the form and notion of state. Therefore 
the influence of this study on my work was rather minor. With similar importance for my 
work was the study of Malcolm Kerr Islamic Reform: The political and Legal Theories 
of Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida (1966) that focused mainly on the juridical 
theories of law and state and the placement of the Sharia in it. 
For a solid historical base of my work I used various general studies of the 
Middle East. To mention some of them William L Cleveland and Martin Bunton‟sA 
History of the Modern Middle East(2009), Bernard Lewis‟s Emergence of Modern 
Turkey (1961), Eduard Gombár‟s Moderní dějiny islámskych zemí(1999) and Dějiny 
Egypta(2009) of the authors Ladislav Bareš, Rudolf Veselý and Eduard Gombár. 
As a method of work I tried to track the schools of thought from the first Islamic 
thinker who looked at the west for a source of inspiration, through Islamic modernism 
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and revivalism. However i was not trying to give a full vast study of all the movements 
that emerged from these first ideologies which spoke to the matter of Islam, society and 
political life. I tried to follow a path of ideas in these movements that beared or 
eventually led to the creation of the first nationalist and secular ideologies. Therefore in 
the last chapters and periods beyond the great thinkers of Islamic revivalism as Afghani, 
„Abduh and Rida I did not follow the strain of thought connected with Islamic 
fundamentalism but lied my emphasis on the first secular and nationalist thinkers. 
In these chapters on Arab Nationalism I was dealing with two kinds of literary 
sources that present two varying interpretations of the origins of this ideology. The older 
one, already mentioned in relation to George Antonius,  which promoted the idea of the 
Arab Christians from Syria who where the creators of secular Arab Nationalismprevailed 
to some extent in Albert Hourani‟s work who stated that for the Christians unlike the 
Muslims, the western and European ideas were not alien therefore they accepted them 
more freely and sooner than their Muslim neighbors. However Hourani does not give the 
central role in the creation of Arab Nationaism to these Christian thinkers as it is in 
Antonius‟s work. Similar ideas to thesecan be found in BassamTibi‟sArab Nationalism 
and HishamSharabi‟sArab Intellectuals. 
6
 
On the other hand these theories were firstly questioned with skepticism by 
Sylvia Haim‟s book Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (1964)
7
 and later with proper 
critical study rejected by Ernest Dawn in his From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on 
the Origins of Arab Nationalism (1973), and later summoned in another essay The 
Origins of Arab Nationalism edited by Rashid Khalidi in 1991. According to his opinion 
it was not the Christians from whom the ideas of nationalism came, rather he derives it 
from the Islamic modernization movements and ideologies. For him the injured self-
view of the Near Eastern thinkers Muslims and Christians alike belonging to the same 
civilization that found itself overcame by an advanced Europe served the need of a 
search for the causes of decline. This self-view united the Christians and Muslims in a 
defense of Islam as a civilization. The emergence of Arab Nationalist thoughts from the 
ranks of these Islamic modernizers is then explained by Dawn in two ways, firstly by the 
emphasis of thinkers as „Abduh, Rida and Kawakibi on the Arabness of Islam who 
sought in it nothing more than a purification and originality of the umma that was in a 
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contemporary bad stage. This emphasis led further than they expected or wished and so 
to the first national ideologies. Another explanation of Dawn is based on an inter-elite 
struggle between the Syrian elites. On one side stood those who were holding 
governmental positions in the Ottoman Empire and therefore stayed loyal to their 
Ottomanism, and on the other stood the ones who did not hold offices in the government 




The aim of my work is to distinguish the influences by which the various schools 
of thought affected each other and investigate which thinkers or ideologies were 
significant on the creation of the Arab Nationalism. This I will try to do in the context of 
the mentioned two historical explanations of the emergence of this movement.  
This work owes much to the research done at the library of the Faculty of Arts at 
Charles University and the National Library of Prague. I must also thank the coordinator 
of my thesis Mgr. PavelŤupek, Ph.D. who helped me in all the steps of my work and had 
great patience with me. 
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 In 1453 when the Ottomans conquered Constantinople, turning it into the new 
capital of their Islamic Empire Istanbul, and after their successful advance into the 
heartlands of Christian Europe and brief conquest of most of the Arabic territories from 
Iraq to eastern Morocco their power seemed unstoppable. The Ottomans were like most 
of the Turkish dynasties Sunni Muslims, but their Sunni character was mainly underlined 
by gaining the holy cities of Islam Mecca and Medina and the base of Sunni Islamic 
thought Al-Azhar in Cairo under their territories and was strengthened by their 
opposition to the Shia Safavid Persian Empire. By this rapid expansion of the Ottomans 
the Sunni Islamic world seemed to be revived in its glory and far ahead of Europe. 
In the later centuries while some internal political processes in The Ottoman 
Empire where the reason of a gradual stagnation and downfall from the peak it lived in 
the 16
th
 century, another movement that took place far behind the borders of Islam 
caused that the Islamic world found itself under the supremacy of Europe and the 
Western world.  
The Renaissance period to which is mainly attributed the artistic developments 
and contributions of such people as Leonardo Da Vinci and Michelangelo mainly started 
as a cultural movement and is considered to be the bridge between the Middle Ages and 
modern history in Europe. This period brought new social and political orders and 
expansion in sciences based on observations in the nature. Among these, the most 
influential scientific novelties were the geographical discoveries, that opened new naval 
routes for the Europeans to Asia around Africa cutting off the Ottoman income from the 
duty of the trade passing through their empire, and the discovery of America and the 
flow of gold from there to Europe. From the social aspects of the Renaissance period the 
most remarkable was the Protestant reformism led by Martin Luther and John Calvin, 




In the later centuries the impact of the Renaissance brought up another two major 
turning points in European history. One of them was the French Revolution in 1789 
which introduced liberal and democratic ideas and in the course of modern history 
triggered the global fall of absolute monarchs and theocracies replacing them with 
republics and democracies. The other one was the Industrial Revolution during which 
new manufacturing processes were introduced that included going from hand production 
to machines. This accelerated the industrial process and opened new possibilities for 
technical developments in Europe. It also had a direct impact on the Islamic world that 
local Oriental economies with their hand productions of goods could not compete with 
the cheaper imported goods from Europe. 
The situation in the Islamic world on the other hand had a different course of 
events in the historical development. Until the fall of Constantinople the Muslims were 
leaders in both the intellectual and technical fields and the states and rulers saw 
themselves to be the dominant force in the world. But after the fall of the city they had 
no longer the supremacy in these fields and the big expansion was only driven by the 
inertia force, but was already the beginning of the end of Muslim hegemony. Still it took 
until the 19
th
 century for the Islamic rulers to realise the switch of power that had 
happened.To this period vaguely stretching from the 16
th
 till the 19
th
 century in Islamic 
history is being referred as the Early Modern period. In the basics of Islamic political 
thinking of this period there were no innovationsexcept basic developments in minor 
fields of political thought as political culture and religious organisation.
9
 
In the Arabic regions and in the Levant in particular we should divide the span of 
the reign of the Ottoman Empire before the reformation and Nahda period in two eras. 
The first was briefly after its conquest, which still in the light of the peak of the Ottoman 
Empire brought progress to these lands. Before the arrival of the Ottoman armies into the 
Levant and into the Arab world in general they were a mass of decentralised and 
unstable local states that fought for hegemony between each other. By the Ottoman 
conquest these territories gained unity, one judicial system and unified currency that 
helped the economies and trade. The prosperity of any community can be measured by 
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the material progress and inhabitednes of its cities. We can spot this in the growth of the 
Arabic cities in this period in both population and urbanization.
10
 
But when the downfall of the Ottomans began and they started to lose the 
centralised power, local authorities and rulers re-emerged from either the feudal 
landowners and tax collectors substituted by the Sultan or from local tribes and families 
acknowledged by him. This policy led to isolation of particular regions from one 
another. As a model example even the societies living in the cities, as it was in 
Damascus for example in the 18
th
 century were divided into the city quarters that were 
totally autonomous of each other and were based on religious, national, tribal or 
professional memberships. They had limited contacts with one another and the gates of 
each quarter would close for the night and open in the morning. On the whole city level, 
the contacts with the surrounding countryside,that provided the agricultural goods for the 
city were very basic too. In reality a person living anywhere in the Arab world in the 
Early  
Modern period had almost no or very limited knowledge of the closest 
surroundings of the place he lived in. Therefore there is no surprise that the Arab 
societies living in isolation could not even imagine the progress and development that 
was taking place in Europe in that time. They were not part of it or influenced by it all. 
The Islamic societies lived in total ignorance of what was happening in Europe. An 
exception was the Christians of Syria and Lebanon who were in contact with the 
Europeans and their thinking through the European Christian missionaries and colleges 
since the 16
th
 century. These colleges began to produce erudite and intellectual 
individuals who for practical reasons and for historical explorations and commentaries 
began to conduct a precise study of Arabic language. These studies eventually led to the 
passion and love of the language and therefore the individuals that emerged from these 
colleges are usually considered by most of the scholars as the starting point and fathers 
of the Arabic literary revival. 
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2. The Age of Reforms and the First Generation of Thinkers 
 
 
The exact dates of the beginning of the Modern history period varies from 
historian to another and varies in regard of which part of the Middle East are we 
speaking about. One of the most frequently used dates is Napoleons expedition to Egypt 
(part of the Ottoman Empire at that time) and his brief defeat of the Mamluk armies and 
advance to Syria that the Ottoman Empire was not capable to stop. The presence of the 
French army in the Orient was short and they were driven out by the Ottoman and 
British coalitionvery soon, nonetheless this experience that showed how much the 
balance of power between the east and west has switched and how unable the Muslims 
were in dealing with the European armies on their soul. This evoked a series of major 
governmental reforms in Istanbul and Cairo since the second decade of the 19
th
 century. 
Albert Hourani divides the evolution of the schools of thought in Modern Islamic history 
into 4 periods. The last one of them covers a historical period ulterior than the span of 
this work, therefore is not mentioned.  
The first period roughly stretching from 1830-1870 is an age when reforming 
thinkers and writers were writing in the light of the mentioned reforms that started to 
take place in the governments of Istanbul and Cairo. These reforms were mainly 
adjusting some laws and institutions to the European model and reforming the military 
and navy systems. Europe in this time was perceived by most of these thinkers as a path 
that can be followed and the aim of their writings was the public still living in their own 
traditional order of world thought to persuade them, that they can adapt some laws and 
institutions from outside the borders of Islam and still remain faithful to their roots.
11
 It 
is important to note, that in this period Europe was perceived as a source of which the 
Muslims can borrow what they consider can be helpful, or as an equal partner from who 
they can gain some inspiration. It was yet never perceived as a dominant civilization or 
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3.1 . Egpyptian Reforms and Rifa’aBadawi Rafi’ al -Tahtawi 
 
In Egypt the reforms are connected to the person of Muhammad „Ali who as a 
chief of the Albanian troops sent to Egypt by the Turkish Sultan gained power in the 
power vacuum left in the country after the withdraw of the French army. After his 
massacre of the mamlukesin 1805 and the confiscation of their lands and properties he 
had enough power and funds to build his empire and was recognised as an Ottoman 
governor by the people of Cairo and by the Ottoman sultan.
12
 
Muhammad Ali became an absolute monarch that in fact ruled his country 
autonomously from the Ottoman government. His absolute rule had the features of many 
previous military governors that on the expense of the Ottoman Empire tried to establish 
a hereditary dynasty of the traditional style. Nevertheless under his command Egypt 
represented the first Middle Eastern state to undertake vast modernizations in military 
and institutions.
13
 Due to these two sides of his rule he is either pictured by historians as 
the Last mamluk or as the founder of modern Egypt.  
Inspired by the French administration and scientific novelties he wanted to create 
an Egypt that would be part of the Western world. Believing that core of the European 
success was in their industrial and scientific conveniences he built modern army and 
navy, irrigation systems and reformed the administration and taxation system. He issued 
no decrees or proclamations of rights and made no attempts to reform the political 
system. His reforms aimed on increasing Egypt‟s power among its neighbours and 
increasing his power in it.  
To create military officers and technical professionals he opened military schools 
where European teachers lectured and later also sent missions of Egyptian students to 
study in France. Even though he discouraged interest in politics, humanities and 
anything other than military and technical sciences he could not prevent the gradual 
acquiring of his students some knowledge of the life in Europe, its literature and ideas of 
Enlightenment and the French revolution. From this generation emerged the first modern 
Egyptian thinker Rifa‟aBadawi Rafi‟ al-Tahtawi (1801-1873). 
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Tahtawi was educated in the traditional way of religious learning at al-Azharand 
became an imam in the new Egyptian army and later was sent as a moral guardian of the 
students of the first mission sent by Muhammad „Ali to France. During his stay he 
gained a deep knowledge of the French language and life and ideas of Enlightenment 
had a strong impact on him. Through his writings after his return he expressed his 
awareness of the advance of the European Christian lands and his admiration to modern 
sciences and he called the Muslims in following and learning from these sciences that 
should be the fuel for the reforms which he advocated.  
In his opinions on the right form of the state he was a traditional thinker 
accepting the rule of an autocrat and he saw that the „only hope of effective reform was 
that the autocrat should use his powers properly‟.
14
 What was new however was his view 
on the Sharia and the European „natural laws‟. He was the first one to suggest that the 
Islamic law was not fixed and established tradition and should be adapted to 
contemporary circumstances. He justified the borrowing from European laws claiming, 
that if an interpretation drawn from a non-Islamic legal code does not contradict with the 
tradition should be accepted. These ideas pushed the thinkers of the next generation to 
open the doors of Ijtihad that had been closed for centuries. Here, in the role of ‘ulama, 
the guardians of the Sharia, he also saw an embodiment of another idea of western 
thought: an active part of the population in the public affairs.
15
 
Another idea with a similar importance was introduced by Tahtawi for the first 
time in Arabic literature. He adopted the concept that the world constituted of countries 
that given their special geographical circumstances had their own special characteristics. 
He introduced the term patrie as fatherland and patriotism from French as watan and 
wataniain Arabic and for him it was Egypt the geographical territory that forms his and 
all Egyptians fatherland, not the Arabic world.
16
 The age in which Tahtawi lived was a 
time when the tensions between the west and east had not grown yet, and therefore in his 
view Europe is not seen as a military or political danger. It only represented science and 
material wealth and the Muslims by learning from the Europeans and sticking to their 
true religion would close up the gap of advance that has emerged between the two 
civilizations.  
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Muhammad 'Ali was not trying to introduce liberal or democratic values to his 
country or to encourage any local Arabic or Egyptian feelings of identity. He regarded 
himself as an Ottoman style ruler that was separate from his subject ethnically and 
linguistically and the language of his high bureaucracy was Ottoman Turkish not Arabic 
which he did not even speak. His preference for the high administrators was also not for 
the local Egyptians but Turkish and Circassians. For practical reasons he relied on 
minority groups too in government and advisory as Christians and Armenians. But his 
pragmatic policies as widespread education that was in Arabic for training local 
professionals and establishing a modern army from the local peasants fellahin led to the 
emergence of Egyptian elite of bureaucrats and first senses of national feeling. In the 




In 1831 Muhammad 'Ali invaded Syria and threatened the heartlands of Ottoman 
Empire itself. During this period his son Ibrahim Pasha ruled Syria and opened the 
country for more European travellers and missions, established a centralised 
administration and an obligatory conscription for the military service, exploited the 
countries resources and established equality among members of all religions and 
nationalities. Nevertheless a wave of discontent and opposition arose from between the 
Syrians and Lebanese when he introduced unpopular regular taxation and disarmament 
of the tribes in the remote mountainous districts. After the advance of Ibrahim Pashas 
army to the Ottoman territories of Minor Asia, that was considered by the European 
powers a threat to the being of the empire which they wanted to preserve, and after their 
intervention Ibrahim Pashas army had to withdraw from the Ottoman Empire and Syria 
back to Egypt. Nevertheless the period of the Egyptian rule in Syria was a new epoch in 
the country that opened the ways for progress and development that became embodied in 








                                                 
17
EduardGombár, Modernídějinyislámskýchzemí(Praha: Karolinum, 1999), 85-87. 
18
Hourani, Arabic Thought, 60. 
18 
 
3.2. The Tanzimat Period in the Ottoman Government  
 
In Istanbul sultan Mahmud II was inspired by Muhammad 'Ali's massacre of the 
Mamluks and defused the Janissaries in 1826 who were his major obstacle in reform and 
who deposed the previous reformer sultan Selim III. This time however they were 
successfully eliminated due to new circumstances which were the new generation of 
bureaucrats conversant with the ideas of modern Europe and the Greek war that resulted 
in the independence of a Greek state where the traditional Ottoman army corps, the 
Janissaries, proved to be ineffective against European advanced military technology and 
strategies.  
Mahmud II.launched the reforms with the creation of a new army, opening new 
schools of a European model and reorganizing the government. However these were 
only minor adjustments to the vehicle of government and state. After Mahmud II‟s death 
a new phase began in the direction of the empire that was carried on not by the sultans 
themselves, but by the Europeanized Ottoman bureaucrats, graduates of the modern 
educational institutions established by Mahmud II. Reshid Pasha, „Ali Pasha and Fuad 
Pasha are the names of the three dominant reformers who led the empire in the most 
intensive reformist part of the 19
th
 century called the Tanzimat. 
19
 
On their insistancetwo major decrees were issued in the name of Mahmud II‟s 
successor Abdulmecid,the Gulhane decree and the Hatt-i Humayun in 1839 and 1856 
and were the expression of a new direction in the empires policy towards its own 
inhabitants and an attempt to introduce new moral and legal basis to the empire and the 
Christian subjects in it.
20
46-46In the time when the European provinces of the Ottoman 
Empire, whose inhabitants were both ethnically and linguistically different from the 
Turkish Muslim leading element,started to drop out encouraged by new senses of 
nationalism and support of the European powers, particularly Russia, the empire had to 
find and promote a new collective civil identity among its subject-citizens. This was an 
Ottoman identity,meaning that all the people living within the boarder of the Ottoman 
Empire are equal and have the same rights, duties, a sense of belonging to one 
community and loyalty to one government. This was a substantial switch in the 
perception of identity that was till then only based on belonging to a religious 
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community and these new ideas were indeed of a secular western character.Thetwo 
decreesensured to all citizens complete equality in front of the law, in paying the taxes 
and recruitment to military service to all the subjects in the empire with no regard to 
religious or national identity.
21
 
This was on one side an attempt to prevent the Balkan provinces from detaching 
from the empire, but also and mainly aimed to hold the remaining parts of the empire 
together and give the multi-national empire a new source of identity in the times of 
emerging national ideologies. The question to be asked here is whether the non-Muslim 
communities will respond to this call for Ottoman patriotism or not and what will be the 
reaction of the Muslims who suddenly found themselves drop from being a first class 
citizens to equal citizens with other religious minorities. 
These decrees were however issued in the name of the sultan as an absolute 
monarch to his people and the new laws emerging from these decrees were growing 
alongside the Sharia that had been till then the only source of judicial system. The power 
of the sultan was growing also because the old institutions that had some control over the 
sultan‟s power were replaced by new ones that were created by him. 
These reforms had indeed their opponents. Some of them where from the 
religious and conservative circles that criticized the governments of heresy 
andtrafficking with the western enemy, others from non-conservative circles opposed the 
reforms not because they disagreed on them in general, but they saw the reforms the way 
they were implemented ineffective.  
Among those was an important politician and grand vizier Ahmed Vekif Pasha in 
who‟s opinion the empire could not rest on the equality of all the national and religious 
sentiments and call for Ottoman unity, because the Christians of the Balkan where 
willing to revolt and struggle for independence. Therefore giving them new freedoms 
would increase their will to revolt. In Ahmed Vekif Pasha‟s opinion the idea of Ottoman 
patriotism and united identity did not have real basis in the society. He saw also that the 
mentioned decree will also give the Powers excuses and opportunities to intervene in the 
matters of the empire.He also criticized the absolutistic character of the decrees where 
due to the abolishment of the old Ottoman institutions the sultan will gain absolute 
freedom of action as an absolute monarch. Therefore in Ahmed Vekif Pasha‟s opinion it 
                                                 
21
FrumaZachs and BasiliusBawardi,”Ottomanism and Syrian Patriotism in Salim al-Bustani‟s Thought,” in 
Ottoman Reform and Muslim Regeneration: Studies in Honour of Butrus Abu-Manneh, edItzchak 
Weismann et al. (London: I.B.Tauris, 2005), 111. 
20 
 
was better to keep the system on its tried principles, that secured the being of the empire 
for centuries and these were the supremacy of the Islamic law and the Turkish Muslim 
element an purify it from corruption and inefficiency.
22
 
The reforms in Istanbul took Europe as an unquestioned model to follow in 
administration, centralization, military and industry and even adopted the European dress 
code to replace the traditional Ottoman clothes in the council and offices. However there 
was one major part of the western political thought that they totally ignored and that is 
the liberal and democratic character of state and a public representation of the 
population. This became the main point of criticize in the next generations thinkers who 
demanded representative governments and constitution. 
 
 
3.3. The Syrian Christians and their Revival of Arabic Literature  
 
 
Unlike the Muslims in Syria, who did not have much direct contact with the west 
because they did not take part in the politics and the central government as a whole the 
Christians had had more experience through the Euro-Christian missions in the region 
for already few centuries. It is generally assumed that unlike the Muslims they had no or 
less prejudice in accepting western values as they did not see in it a betrayal to their 
hereditary culture and traditions, nor did they have to justify to the members of the 
community any adoptions from outside
23
, this interpretation is however questioned and 
reconsidered by authors like Ernest Dawn.
24
 
While the concern of the Muslims was how to reform the umma and the empire 
to revive their past glories, the main concern of the Christians was where was their place 
in the society in the light of these new reforms. Until then they had lived in closed 
religious communities with no political life. Their identity was shaped by the religious 
membership like the identities of Muslims. Because they did not possess the loyalty to 
the Ottoman Empire as the protector of the Sunni Islam, therefore they were more 
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willing to support this new Ottomanist course of policy. Here the Muslims had more 
hesitations.  
But if the Christians should leave their closed religious communities as the maker 
of their identity, which community should they belong to and what identity should they 
acquire? The Ottoman Empire despite its new policies was an Islamic state with a 
majority of Muslim citizens and in the view of many these reforms were carried on to 
assure Islamic revival against Christian Europe, so to what extent could they become an 
equal part of it? Driven by these questions and by the precise study of Arabic language 
since the previous century the consciousness of an Arabic past and glory began to 
emerge. The idea that all who speak Arabic have something in common and that the 
territory they inhabit constitutes an Arabic homeland similar to the idea of Ottomanism 
formed an alternative to sectarian based religious identities. This ideology was later to be 
regarded as Arabism.
25
 After the events of the civil war in Syria and Lebanon in 1860 
the need to find an alternative to religion based loyalties became more urgent. 
One of the first and most prominent Christian Arab thinkers was Butrus al-
Bustani from a Maronite Lebanese family with a tradition of providing educated scholars 
and intellectuals from its ranks. He is regarded to be by most of the contemporary 
western and Arabic scholars as an Ottoman patriot who encouraged local territorial 
identity of Syrian patriotism. For him as for many other writers of his time having 
multiple identities that were not exclusive to each other was a common occurrence. He 
considered that man can have one large identity and sub-identities within each other that 
do not contradict with themselves. Therefore his loyalty was to the Ottoman government 
and his sense to belonging to a sub-fatherland was to Syria, which was only one of the 
fatherlands that constitute the empire. He saw that the Ottoman Empire was actually the 
protector of the Syrian patriotism against foreign intervention and against sectarian 
patriotism. He never advocated separation from the empire.  
He was an Ottoman reformer advocating autonomous government under the 
shield of the Ottoman Empire with Arabic as a language of administration and 
education.
26
In his theories on reform he believed, that the Near East could revive itself 
only through borrowing the knowledge of European sciences. The borrowings however 
should not be blindfolded. The Near East should be able to judge and criticize the 
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aspects of European civilization and adopt only those, that it would consider helpful and 
compatible with its customs and traditions. The Arabic civilization had its great past that 
it lost because it lost its desire to learn due to various factors. That is what happens to 
every civilization which reaches its peak in a historical period. Europe has learned from 
the Arabs and built on that knowledge. The Arabs instead of searching for means of 
revival in themselves only, can easily speed up this process by learning from Europe and 
so learn in a short time what took Europe centuries to achieve. 
 Like Tahtawi, he emphasises loyalty to the Sultan and value of national unity 
embodied in his Syrian patriotism. Perhaps due to the fact of being a Christian and 
thanks to his life experiences of breaking out the Maronite community and becoming a 
Protestant he lays higher emphasis than Tahtawi on religious freedom and equality 
between different faiths.
27
His enormous contribution to the world of Arabic language is 
reflected in his work that contained the assistance in translating the Bible to Arabic, 
establishing his own school The National School were Arabic language and modern 
sciences were taught and his two overwhelming works the Arabic dictionary Al-Muhit 
and Arabic encyclopediaDa‟irat Al-Ma‟arif. His aim was to create a modern Arabic 
language that would be correct in its grammar and precise and easy to understand for the 
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4. Islamic Modernism:The Young Ottomans, Jamal al-Din al-
Afghani and Rashid Rida 
 
 
In the second period 1870-1900,on one hand the Islamic civilization became 
closer to the European one. Reforms took their roots, change seemed unavoidableand a 
new generation of intellectuals that were educated in new schools of European model 
were filling the governmental posts, but on the other hand the relations between the two 
civilizations became more tense as the European armies were present in many Muslim 
countries and the influence of European powers was felt through their 
diplomaticpressures in all the centres of the Islamic world.  
In this phase the aim of the thinkers was to keep the continuity of the Islamic 
society despite the changes it was going through. In other words, they were trying to 
convince those who adopted European values that they can and should still hold to 
something from their past and culture in order to prevent becoming alienated from their 
own environment. 
The writers of this generation that we are considered about here are however 
different from those of the first phase. It might seem that the evolution of thought in this 
phase was just a natural progress in the thinking of the first generation and building up 
on what they brought in, but these thinkers were aware of new circumstances that shaped 
the course of Middle Eastern history in the 1870s and 1880s and the military occupations 
of the western powers of the Middle East. Therefore in their thought there is a drastic 
switch in direction in both,the topics theywere mostly concerned about and also the 
solutions that they offered. While for Tahtawi Europe presented only the ideas and 
inventions of human reason and perfection, while the political danger of one European 
country in his view was considered that can be checked on by another European country 
therefore did not consider a threat in his mind, this became a serious issue for this later 
generation. The problem of Thatawis thought is the backwardness of the Islamic world 
in comparison to the west, but the centre of his focus is not the west, but the Islamic 
world itself. The decline of his world and how to address it is the question that he tried to 
answer. For the next generation this problem was maintained but overshadowed by a 
24 
 
more urgent one: the existence and continuity of the Islamic world threatened by an 
external force represented in the European interference and occupation.
29
 
This generation also saw the reforms as a necessary step in order to cure the 
internal decline of the umma and prevent the foreign interference. However where they 
differed was where they were searching for the ideals that should guide their reforming 
efforts. By asking question as whether it is necessary for directing the reforms to derive 
them from the European model or whether they can be derived from the principles of 
Islam we can see their reforming ambitions. But these thinkers were not whole hearted 
westernizers like the “French knowers”, the leading bureaucrats of the tanzimat. They 
stressed on their belonging to the Islamic tradition and claimed that reform could be 
directed from the Islamic law itself. They also claimed that many of the European values 
as liberalism and democracy are not foreign to Islam, but are actually corresponding with 
the Islamic principle of shura (consultation) that was present in the prophet and was later 
abandoned. Therefore reform is not an innovation but a necessary implication of Islam. 
They also pointed on how Islam in its history was the protector and cause of scientific 
discoveries and its compatibility with the modern world. 
Another element not emphasized in Hourani‟s work, but Dawn gives it proper 
recognition is the “perception of the Self” of the intellectuals in the Islamic world as a 
“deprived relative to the Other”
30
that was increasing the more the western adoptions 
were taking place. This injured perception of the self view as the Islamic world being 
culturally inferior to Europe that was yet not present in the times of Tahtawi, began to 
emerge and later reached its peak with the peak of colonialism. It created a reaction that 
emerged in the form of an opposition to the current establishment in the Ottoman Empire 
under the name the Young Ottomans who grasped the opportunity when the Eastern 
crisis indicated how much the tanzimat were ineffective in bringing the Islamic world to 
equivalent position with Europe. 
The Young Ottomans were not from the beginning a coherent organization or a 
school of thought. Their members had slight distinctions in ideas from one another and 
were formed into an official body only later. What they had in common was their dislike 
to the autocratic government of the reforming Ali and Fuad Pasha, critics of the blind 
folded imitations of the west, demands for public representation in the government in the 
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form of a constitution and an elected parliament and a strong feeling of belonging to an 
Islamic Ottoman society. They expressed their ideas by a new political weapon in that 
time, the press. Therefore are considered to be the first political movement of wide 
public influence in the Islamic history. One of the most prominent speakers of the Young 
Ottomans Namik Kemal pushed the concept of the Ottoman patriotism even further than 
in the decrees of 1839 and 1856 while linking it with the respect of the Islamic 
foundations of the Ottoman society. This is where they differed from the secular course 
that the Ottoman patriotism was undergoing in the theory of tanzimat.
31
 
In 1876 Midhat Pasha, one of the associates of the Young Ottomans led a coup 
d'état after few years of the chaotic rule of Sultan Abdulaziz and the death of Ali Pasha 
in 1871 combined with Russian international threats and deposed the Sultan for another 
member of royal family Abdulhamid II. Midhat Pasha declared a new constitution with 
responsible ministry, an appointed Senate, an elected council of deputies and a hierarchy 
of local councils
32
, that the sultan pledged to respect. However he was only forced to do 
so due to the pressure of the Powers and when he felt more firm in his position hi 
dissolved the parliament and suspended the constitution in the same year. This was a 
shortly lived first constitutional experience in the Ottoman Empire which was succeeded 
by three decades of an autocratic rule of the Sultan Abdulhamid. 
The doctrine of Islamic modernism got its full expression in the persons of two 
great scholars in the Islamic history Jamal ad-Din al- Afghani and Muhammad „Abduh 
who are regarded as the fathers of Islam‟s revival and teachers of many thinkers of the 
next generations. Their influence is present not only in the Islamic thinkers but they are 
considered as a source of primal inspiration by the protagonists of Arab nationalism.  
Al-Afghani as his name claims was born in Afghanistan, however the early 
period of his life is hardly documented and there is evidence that he might have been 
born in Persia, a claim that many of his opponents made to disqualify him. His Persian 
origin would imply his belonging to the Shia Muslims, which considering that most of 
his life was spent in Sunni countries and that his message was meant to address all the 
Muslims, would discredit him. He spent most of his life traveling from one Muslim 
country to another in his search for the “perfect ruler” who would cooperate with him in 
the mission of regeneration of Islam, and he was always disappointed. His career was 
                                                 
31
Cleveland and Bunton, Modern Middle East, 86. 
32
Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, 114. 
26 
 
troubled due to his impatient nature and temperament and when he did not achieve what 
he wanted or got in a rupture with a ruler he soon withdrew all his sympathies and used 
his influence and effort in agitating against him. That often led to his eviction from the 
country.  
In Afghanis thought the central problem was the threat of Christian west which 
he felt thorough the Islamic world and was often its witness in India, Egypt and Istanbul. 
All his effort was focused on how to overcome this political and military expansion. He 
wanted the Islamic world to regain its power, but for him this was not a political goal 
primarily, rather a social one concerning the whole umma. He wanted the Muslims to 
understand the proper Islam and live in accordance to its teachings freed from popular 
superstitions and misleading interpretations. By doing so they would become strong 
again because as the strength of Europe lies in its knowledge, the weakness of Orient lies 
in its ignorance. This ignorance could not be overcome by simply imitating and adopting 
the knowledge of the west, which is the fruit of a long termed evolution of thought that is 
needed in Islam too and it is the true understanding of the religion. This European 
knowledge and superiority was not only compatible with Islam but infact imbedded in 
the very essence of the Muslim faith
33
 and was borrowed by Europe from the Muslims 
and used for their advantage while the Muslims abandoned the true principles of their 
religion and therefore fell into stagnation. Therefore the backwardness of the Islamic 
world he states is not caused by the backwardness of Islam itself, but by the 
backwardness of the Islamic religious structures and society and the reforming 
governments which had knuckled under to the Europeans by the piecemeal borrowing of 
European practices. This should be solved by eliminating the corruption in the political 
system and return to the true pristine Islam.
34
 
Another appeal is for the unity of all Muslims in the world. This unity can be 
divided in Afghanis thought into three levels. 1. The feeling of the bound of solidarity 
that should bind all the Muslims in the world with a sense of belonging to one 
community. This sense is more importantthan any other identity and he deplored 
emerging national ideologies asa western forgery meant to weaken, not strengthen the 
umma. 2. A political cooperation on the level all the governments and states in the 
Islamic world in order to face the common enemy embodied in the west. The rulers of 
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the Islamic lands should not stand in the way of the unity of Islam, and if they did it was 
legitimate to depose them. However he did not advocate the necessity of a unified 
Islamic state or recreation of the Caliphate of early times. If the rulers will cooperate in 
the service of Islam there is no need for a unified state. 3. Reconciliation between the 
Sunnis and Shia Muslims and their offshoots. In his opinion even the greatest doctrinal 
conflicts could be outweigh for the sake of unity. 
35
 
A new element present in Afghanis work is that when he speaks of Islam he is 
not speaking of a religion but of a civilization which is authentic in its own and this 
authenticity is what distinguishes it from the west and is the source of its strength. From 
this claim and the opposition to the west drove the Arab nationalists inspiration years 
later.  Although he was not a constitutionalist, nevertheless his frequent agitations 
against the rule of Islamic governors blew the wind in the sails of constitutionalist and 
emerging nationalist opposition movements in the Middle East. His critic of the 
backwardness of the Islamic religious orders also caused general erosion of people‟s 
faith in the unquestioned position of the „ulama and their influence. 
Both Afghani and „Abduh advocated the concept of Islamic umma that unified all 
the Muslims and overshadowed any national belongings. Neither of them was hostile to 
the rule of the Ottomans over the Arab lands and if any nationalism should be found 
beyond the Islamic unity it would be the Egyptian, not Arab in „Abduh‟s thought.
36
 
One of „Abduh‟s followers, the writer of his biography and his ideological heir, 
Rashid Rida, also considered by most of the scholars as an Islamic reformist brought a 
new element of Arabist thinking to his Pan-Islamic doctrine. Similarly as Afghani and 
„Abduh he advocated the necessary return to the principles of true and abandoned Islam. 
Here however he puts more emphasis on the fact that early Islam was an Islam of the 
Arabic ancestors and therefore the revival of early Islam is the revival of Arabism. To 
Rida the Arabic language is the only language in which the doctrines and laws of Islam 
could be transmitted. He also states that the Turks are the ones who usurped the 
Caliphate from the Abbasids and therefore from the legitimate tribe of Quraysh and by 
that undermined Islam.
37
 Rashid Rida sees a clear distinction between the Arabs and the 
Turks and the formers are the ones to whom greater glory and first place belongs.  
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After the death of his master Muhammad „Abduh he started to act with greater 
freedom and established some connections with the organizations and societies in Syria 
and Lebanon opposing the rule of the Sultan Abdulhamid II. And when the Young Turks 
revolution ended the absolute monarchy of the sultan he favoured it until the Turk 
nationalist signs of the Committee of Union and Progress started to rise. Even though in 
1916 when the Arab revolt against the Ottoman rule broke out and he favoured Arabic 
separation for practical reasons as he said “it would be of the benefit to all Muslims”, he 
did not prior to 1916 question or undermine the political position of the Ottoman rule as 
he saw in it a continuity and strength of Islam and after the First World War broke out he 
initially called all the Muslims to protect the Ottoman Caliphate. But it is more than 
natural that his support for the Ottoman Empire withdrew after the hanging incidents of 
the 6
th
 of May 1916 in Damascus and Beirut committed by Jamal Pasha and then later 
supported the Arab Revolt. 
Whatever glorification of Arabism he made, he made for the purpose of 
regeneration of the Islamic Umma. It was a sub-content with the purpose to serve the 
main content.
38
 It is important here to point to the fact that Rida‟s life was stretching in 
two historical periods already mentioned by Hourani, the first one being the last three 
decades of the 19
th
 century and the second one being the first four decades of the 20
th
 
century. If we focus on the pre-war period we will see that Rida‟s thought did not much 
differ from that of Afghani‟s and Abduh‟s who did not live to witness the war. He was a 
Pan-Islamic reformist thinker who had to search for other alternatives than loyalty to the 
Ottoman government for the purpose of his Pan-Islamic ideology after the loss in WWI 
and Turkish nationalism caused the abolition of the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate.  
All the thinkers discussed in this chapter of Islamic modernism had the common 
feature that they tried to merge the tradition of Islamic law and the essence of modern 
life. All of the did hold loyalty to the Ottoman Empire and government even when some 
of them to a higher or lesser extent advocated some ethnical distinction of the Arab 
element. Anyhow none of them demanded any political or territorial consequences to 
their Arabism. The first one of the Muslim thinkers to demand political representation of 
the Arabs on their own, presented in the idea of a dual state where the centre of power 
would be switched from the Turks to the Arabs was „Abd al-Rahman al-
                                                 
38





Therefore he is by some regarded as the first Muslim Arab nationalist or 
even as the first precursor of modern secular Pan-Arabism was and he shall be discussed 
in the next chapters. 
 




The third period covering the years from 1900 till 1939 is an era when the 
previous process and the two strands of thought that the previous generations tried to 
hold together moved further apart from each other. On one side were those who stood 
firmly on the Islamic bases of society and by gradual polarization of ideologies moved 
further to Islamic fundamentalism. This ideology went not only to the principles of Islam 
but also to a historic period that embodied what they believed to be the results of the 
right principles of the religion. This ideology saw the solution of the problems of the 
Islamic world in the return to the roots of Islam. According to this movement the Islamic 
umma has deflected during the centuries of its existence from the true belief and the right 
principles and that is the reason of its degradation.  
For the Islamic fundamentalists there could be no better period in the history, 
which embodied the right principles and the political success of the umma more than the 
time of the prophet and his rightful successors al-khulafa’ al-rashidun. This era became 
a source of imitation and idealism to them and an utopia they tried to reach.
40
 
On the other side by the evolution of Islamic modernism and gradual loosening 
the bonds with the Islamic principles secular ideologies have emerged. For them Islam as 
a religion was nevertheless respected but regarded as only one of the features of the 
nation but not a norm in accordance to which life in society should be 
regulated.
41
Therefore the secular principles of the writers of this era and ideology were 
that of nationalism whether Turkish or Arabic or other regional nationalist ideologies. 
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What started as one movement of thought from the need to reform the Islamic 
societies and government in some way to overcome the European hegemony now split in 
two major strains that sought for inspiration in two different directions, nonetheless to 
achieve the same goal. 
In the previous chapters, terms as Arabism and Arab Nationalism occurred, 
however to deal with them in a more detailed manner there is a necessity to classify this 
terminology. To define the term Arab Nationalism and to distinguish from related 
terminology I am using the definition used by AdeedDawisha in his book Arab 
Nationalism in the Twentieth Century which he derived from various studies and authors 
on the issue of nationhood, ethnicity and nationalism. As Bernard Lewis stated a nation 
is “a group of people held together by a common language, belief in a common descent 
and in a shared history and destiny. They usually but do not necessarily inhabit a 
contiguous territory; they often enjoy, and if they do not enjoy they commonly 
seek,sovereign independence in their own name”.
42
 The emphasis of the nation‟s 
sovereign independence in its own name is what distinguishes the nation from an ethnic 
group. The latter does not seek political sovereignity. The distinction of the political 
level in the Arab nation‟s desire to form an independent political unity represented in a 
unified state is what presents the ideology of Arab Nationalism. On the other hand the 
term Arabism covers everything mentioned in the term Arab Nationalism except the 
desire for a political unity of the Arabs on their own. Therefore there is a difference in 
saying that someone is an adherent of Arabism, as can be said of Tahtawi, Butrus al-
Bustani and Muhammad „Abduh for instance to whom this was an identity of being an 
Arab not incompatible with other identities and with no political affiliations deriving 
from this identity. On the other hand an Arab nationalist regards himself as an Arab 
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 century when the failures of Ottoman military against Europe began to 
accumulate, specifically in the treaty of KucukKaynarca in 1774 in which the Ottoman 
Sultan was titled as the caliph of the Islamic nation for the first time in an official 
document, a policy of Ottoman highlighting this claim began. In this era also a legend 
was created telling the story of the Sultan Selim I. and his conquest of Cairo in 1517 
after which he officially accepted the title that passed on him from the last Abbasid 
caliph.
43
 During the tanzimat period this claim was overshadowed by that of the sultan as 
the monarch of all the subjects of the empire, but in the reign of Abdulhamid the stress 
on the concept of the caliph sultan re-emerged, perhaps from the need to re-assure the 
loyalty of the Arab Muslim subjects that were the majority of the empire and felt 
threatened by the tanzimat policy. 
However the reaction was not as it was awaited. For the Arabs the caliphate 
represented an inherited doctrine and was connected with a pride of their nation and their 
credits for Islam. More than that, according to the teaching of the tradition (sunna) the 
caliphate was an office for a privileged tribe of Quraysh, therefore the Ottoman sultan 
could not have the legal basis to claim this position. They regarded him as a ruler and 
protector of Islam, but not a caliph.  
The Islamic modernist thinkers had always highlighted the special place of the 
Arabs and the Arabic language in Islam and in this mood they were considering in 
theory the possibility of the return of the caliphate to the Arabs. This way they thought 
nothing would stand in their way for carrying out the reforms in accordance to the 
Islamic law and restore the glory of the umma. But they were aware of the shield which 
the Ottoman sultan shed over the Arab Islamic countries and that he was their protector 
from the threat of western Europe. But as time moved on and the pressure of the western 
powers on the Empire increased and the sultan proved to be unable to defend the Muslim 
lands ideas of an Arab caliphate were gaining momentum.
44
 
The first thinker to pronounce these ideas in their full expression was Abd al-
Rahman al-Kawakibi. He was a Syrian from Aleppo, had a classical education and 
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worked as an official and journalist. He was an opponent of the autocratic rule of 
Abdulhamid and a rival of one of his advisors who was from a noble family from the 
same city of Aleppo and had a family quarrel with Kawakibi‟s family earlier. (This 
might also be one of the causes of his hostility to the Ottoman court as we shall see later 
according to Ernest Dawn‟s theory on the emergence of Arab nationalist thinkers from 
the class of the Syrian elite who did not possess positions in the Ottoman government). 
Al-Kawakibi wrote two books Umm al-qura and Taba’i’ al-istibdad which are  
classical works of and Arab intellectual of that time that was dealing with the question of 
the decay of the Islamic ummaand the reasons that led to this decay and the possibilities 
to cure it, al-da’ wa al-dawa’ (the illness and the remedy). 
45
 His emphasis lays on 
blaming the rulers of the Islamic world who have encouraged false spirit of pure 
imitation among the people. This way the can keep the people ignorant and passive 
which is for their own personal gain. For him the right state is a state where the people 
enjoy freedom and justice and the government‟s purpose is the happiness and prosperity 
of its people and in the same time is being controlled and watched by them. None of 
these ideas are innovative however. What gives al-Kawakibi the importance among 
historians is his formulation of the Arabic caliphate. In order to create a just state not 
only reform of law and institution and right education is needed but also a major transfer 
of the power from the Turks to the Arabs, specifically the Arabs of the Arab Peninsula is 
needed. The reason why this is necessary he provides in stating the position of the holy 
cities and the Arabic language in the Islamic world and he states also that beduins are not 
affected by moral decline and corruption, therefore are more suitable for government. 
When the caliphate is moved to the Arab Peninsula and Arab caliph from the tribe of 
Quraysh will be elected and though the tradition of Islamic law fulfilled. 
46
 
Being the first one to advocate some sort of political recognition to the Arab 
nation and a switch of power from the centre in Istanbulto the Arabic lands gives him the 
acknowledgement of being the first precursor of secular Pan-Arabism. 
47
 However we 
can see that the matter he spoke to was of the whole Islamic umma, and similiary to Rida 
he also uses the glorification of Arabs for the higher purpose of the glorification of 
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5.2. Syrian Christian Nationalists and Secularists  
 
 
Among the Christians in the time between the dusk of the 19
th
 till the dawn of the 
20
th
 century ideas of belonging to an Arab nation and a necessity of a political 
representation to this fact were spreading. In their writings these thesis were overriding 
those of al-Kawakibi which were in the end reluctant to champion complete political 
independence for the Arabs from the Turks.
48
 They were the outgrowth of a school of 
writers and first journalists in the Arab world started by those as Butrus al-Bustani.
49
 
From the first of them were Negib „Azoury and Ibrahim al-Yaziji who advocated 
the thoughts of Rida and Kawakibi by blaming the Turks from being the cause of decline 
however they did so with a special Arab Christian twist of theirs. For them the Turks did 
not ruin the Islam but ruined the Arabs who were the greatest of nations. These two 
thinkers were perhaps the first ones to advocate a total break-up from the Turks and 
create a secular, liberal nation state that would spread from Iraq to the Suez Canal.
50
 
They addressed this call to all the Arabs which were equal Muslims and Christians, but 
their advocating fell on deaf ears, for the concern of most of the Muslims of that time 
was the still persisting hope for the revival of Islam that was the sole and last guarantee 
of independence against the west. The role of these thinkers and their contribution to the 
creation of Arab Nationalism had been overemphasized by George Antonius and 
prevailed for decades as an official propaganda of Arab Nationalism.
51
 This notion has 
been overcame by many contemporary scholars and it is believed that the concept of 
Arab Nationalism could hardly had flourished in the 19
th
 century among the majority. 
Another Christian thinker of that time with a slightly different opinions, but with 
no bigger response was Farah Antun. He was also a proponent of secular nationalism 
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which was popular among the Christian intelligentsia in that time, but he did not 
emphasize his Arab nationalist views as often as the others and expressed more less 
loyalty to the Ottoman sultanate.  
His emphasis lied on the relationship between religion and science and from that 
the resulting relation between the religious and secular forms of government. These 
ideas brought him into an engagement and controversy with Muhammad „Abduh. For 
him in the soul of a human there were two separate subjects: the intellect and the heart. 
Derived from that, there were two disciplines, science and religion, in the society. The 
domain of the religion is the heart and the domain of the science is the intellect. The 
problem occurs when one of these disciplines claims title on the domain of the other. 
The two are incompatible, therefore should stay separate. 
The same it is not only in this theoretical field of Antun‟s work, but also in his 
political views. There, derived from the previous concept, the spiritual authorities should 
be separated from the temporal so that total toleration between the men of different faith 
can be assured. 
52
By doing so, the political power would be in secular hands ensuring a 
state based on freedom, equality and national strength.
53
 
This is where his argument with „Abduh was rooted. Muhammad „Abduh shared 
his opinions on the importance of modern science, but believed that Islam if purified 
does not stand in the way of science and serves as a basis for political life. He was also 
willing to accept some degree of separation between the religious and temporal powers, 
but regarded the religious authorities to be the legal guardian of the law which should be 
created not independently but derived from the sharia. On Antun‟s theory of the state 
and equality amongst its members he advocated equal positions for non-Muslims but in 
an essentially Islamic state.
54
 
We can spot Antun‟s very positive regard to nationalism in general as a force that 
helps to unify and preserve civilization. There is nothing fanatic in his views and that can 
be spotted in the way he regards to the other nationalities. Unlike „Azoury and al-Yaziji 
he does not blame the Turks for ruining Islam or the Arabs. On the contrary, the Turks 
and the Persians and their patriotic spirit were shat maintained the umma.
55
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5.3. The Origins of Arab Nationalism 
 
 
The question of the origin of Arab Nationalism is often being raised and different 
scholars provide different answers, and in certain periods of the study of Arab 
Nationalism some explanations of this question dominated others. For many years the 
concept that the Arab nationality for centuries supressed and marginalized by Islam and 
the Turks was revived thanks to the contacts of the western Christian missionaries who 
established their schools among the Christians of the Near East who later led their 
Muslim compatriots to base the fundamentals of the political life and cornerstone of 
identity on nationality not on religion. This explanation was given mainly by George 
Antonius and early western scholars, and was maintained for decades and embodied in 
the general ideology of Arab Nationalism of the twentieth century.  
Opposing to this is the theory that Arab Nationalism sprang from Islamic 
modernism of Afghani and „Abduh.
56
 This theory is partly mentioned in the book of 
Hourani and it holds that when „Abduh and his scholars tried to apply the 
“commonplaces of European society” to their own to restate the principle of Islamic 
society, the effect was more reaching than they have expected and created the ideology 
of secular nationalism
57
. What is not hard to understand is that Islamic modernism‟s 
attempt to conciliate the western laws and institutions with Islam and critics of the 
Islamic religious orders led to increasing scepticism concerning Islam among Muslims.
58
 
This however does not fully explain why would the thinkers influenced by Islamic 
modernism switch their focus from the Islamic tradition as the base of the right state and 
society to nationality when thinkers as Afghani and „Abduh clearly denied such 
principles. This leads us to an assumption that there must have been some other 
influencing elements which helped the creation of the Arab Nationalism and came from 
outside the doctrine of Islamic modernism. Perhaps this means that Islamic modernism 
as a chief factor had its role in emphasizing the role of Arabic in Islam and therefore 
unwillingly switched the interest of the public to it, however the nationalist doctrines 
were imported from outside the circle of the modernist ideology. 
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Other interpretations do not consider the influence of Islamic modernism as a 
chief factor on the creation of Arab Nationalism. For Sylvia G. Haim and Ellie Kedourie 
Islamic modernism by implication produced authors of Islamic secularism who were 
predominantly Ottomanists of secular tendencies. And for these two scholars Arab 
Nationalism was an importation from the west and established by military officers 
installed in power after the First World War by the British. Similarly to them another 
two scholars Sharabi and Tibi also deny the clear connection between Islamic 
modernism and nationalism stating that Islamic modernism led to the emergence of 
Islamic secularists whose ideology dominated the Arab Nationalists policy until the 
interwar period when they were overridden by the ideology of Arab Nationalism. This is 
where Sharabi and Tibi differ from Haim and Kedourie in the conclusion which gives 
answer to the question: from wheredid this Arab Nationalism of the twentieth century 
come? For these two scholars it was the secular Arab Nationalism of the Syrian 
Christians that overrode the Islamic modernism and Islamic secularism.
59
 
Another theory and deffinetly a very common one is that the Arab Nationalism 
emerged as a reaction to the Turkish Nationalism embodied in the ideology of the Young 
Turks that got its official political representation in the Committee of Union and 
Progress. Before the revolution of the Young Turks there had been movements among 
the Arabs opposing the despotism of the rule of Abdulhamid II. In Egypt such ideas 
could be expressed more freely in the press, however in Syria and Lebanon they had to 
move into the hidden sphere of underground and secret societies.   
These movements were similarly common among the Turkish speaking people of 
the Empire who criticized the despotic character of the government too and called for the 
restoration of the constitution from 1876. So as we can see the Arabs and Turks were on 
the same boat in this movement and it seemed that they had the same goals and believes. 
However after the Young Turks came to power it became clear that while they were for 
constitutional government they were first of all Turkish Nationalists. When the Arabs 
who till then advocated only loyalty to the Ottoman government and in the sense of the 
ideology of Arabism which can be regarded to most of them demanded only autonomy, 
official recognition of Arabic language as a language of bureaucracy and education, 
decentralisation and representation in the central government realised this nationalist 
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character of the Young Turks they must have suffered a certain shock. For them this only 
replaces the despotism of Abdulhamid by the despotism of the Young Turks with even 
worse conditions, because however Abdulhamid‟s rule was centralised and the Arabs 
could not participate in it at least his propaganda was that of him as the Sultan of all 
Muslims and now the centre of focus started to move on to the Turkish element of the 
empire. This new fact as this theory holds was the main force pushing these Arab 
thinkers of that time from their ideologies of Ottomanism and Islamic reformism to 
become Arab Nationalists. 
60
 
In the ideology of the Young Turks the Arab element was the reason of the 
backwardness of the empire that kept holding its progress back. On the other side in the 
ideology of the Arab Nationalism that emerged similar thoughts occurred as that the 
Turks were the cause of the backwardness of the Arab lands and their conquest started 
the era of decline while before that the Arabs had a prospering and advanced civilization. 
Therefore these two contradictory ideologies had as a result the natural movement of the 
Turkish and Arabic element further apart from each other. However what is being 
questioned is to what extent did the Arab intellectuals in this period acquire the ideology 
of Arab Nationalism and how many of them did become Arab Nationalists and how 
many of them stayed loyal to the ideology of Arabism and the Ottoman Empire. Dawn is 
providing a detailed study of this issue through the study of the members of societies that 
were active before 1914 for Arab Nationalist goals. However his study is lacking 
availability of bibliographical data on all the memebers, he is suggesting that even after 
the Young Turk revolution most of the Arab thinkers stayed loyal to the Ottoman Empire 
and the Arab Nationalists were only a minority.
61
 
All these theories in some way reflect the wide scale of the process of formation 
a political movement which has many diverse factors and influences. We can sum up 
that except the theories of George Antonius (which is only false in the exaggeration of 
the role of the Christians, not in the concept itself) all of them have been precisely 
researched with a solid material and are current until today. The most important factors 
on the creation of Arab Nationalism therefore were, the evolution of Islamic modernist 
ideology, the literary revival of the Christian Arabs and their Arab patriotism, reaction 
on the Turkish nationalism. 
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When Tahtawi first landed in Marseille and when he wrote to the eastern public 
about his experiences and observations of Europe he had no doubts that the Islamic 
world and western civilization belong to the same modernity and are equal partners that 
should enjoy its benefits. 
However his later generation could not work in such a friendly environment 
anymore. The west has shown its rapacity and drew precise boarders between its 
civilization and the Oriental world. This required the Islamic thinkers to take a defensive 
position. The contribution of the main bearers of the of doctrine of Islamic modernism, 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad „Abduh and Rashid Rida, can be summed up in, 
that they tried to hold together two streams that were already on the way apart from each 
other. Or they tried to say that none of these two streams are the right answer for the 
Islamic world and that there is middle way between them which suits the purpose of 
creating the right society.  
The first of these streams were the recognised institutions sunni Islamic learning 
al-Azhar in Cairo and al-Zaytuna in Tunis, where they had no political power, were not 
the speakers of their people and foremost were intellectually backward and their minds 
possessed no virtue.
62
The second stream is represented in the westernizers who held the 
idea that religion is not compatible with modern society and therefore the basis of law 
should be the national sentiment. By these means however they destroyed the moral 
basis of society.  
The Islamic modernizers viewed themselves as the one standing in the middle of 
the two, they had the independence of mind that is necessary to understand both the 
Islamic law and the modern world. However no matter how much they preached this 
ideology they could never bring this utopia to practise. The scepticism aroused by them 
about the traditional religious orders of the Islamic society drew people far from into the 
hands of secular ideologies. The critics they produced of the west on the other side drew 
the people into the hands of fundamental Islamic ideologies.  
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It seems as if the field of thought of these three masters is blurred between the 
two counter poles and in the end it totally vanishes. This might be what Reinhard 
Schulze meant when he said that colonialism snared a trap: “every cultural act of the 
colonised could be regarded as fundamentalism or westernizing”.
63
 Therefore it is no 
surprise that in the latter generations Afghani, „Abduh and Rida are being claimed and 
regarded as the fathers of both the Islamic fundamentalism movements and and the 
nationalist ones, both the one that they regarded to be the counter poles of the political 
sphere and both the ones they condemned.  
The emergence of Arab Nationalism in the last period studied in my work must 
be traced to its roots in the 19
th
 century, from the developments of schools of thought 
mentioned above. When first calls for a national unity based on affiliation of all those 
who speak the Arabic language were claimed, it were the Syrian Christians who came up 
with them. They were however a minority and their voices had no impact on a society 
that could not share such ideas in that time yet. Nevertheless, being the first advocators 
of this ideology and inspiration for latter generations they should be regarded if not as 
creator than as forerunners of Arab Nationalism.  
Gradually among the Muslim thinkers ideas of Arab nationalism were taking 
place in the first years of the 20
th
 century in spired by both the affiliations of the Islamic 
modernists to the Arabness of Islam and by the preaching of the Syrian Christians. 
However on the eve of the First World War representatives of these ideologies were only 
a minority and their rise was only to come in the inter-war era and their peak represented 
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